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Abstract—Incentive mechanisms for crowdsourcing have been
extensively studied under the framework of all-pay auctions. Along
a distinct line, this paper proposes to use Tullock contests as an
alternative tool to design incentive mechanisms for crowdsourcing.
We are inspired by the conduciveness of Tullock contests to attracting
user entry (yet not necessarily a higher revenue) in other domains.
In this paper, we explore a new dimension in optimal Tullock contest
design, by superseding the contest prize—which is fixed in con-
ventional Tullock contests—with a prize function that is dependent
on the (unknown) winner’s contribution, in order to maximize the
crowdsourcer’s utility. We show that this approach leads to attractive
practical advantages: (a) it is well-suited for rapid prototyping in
fully distributed web agents and smartphone apps; (b) it overcomes
the disincentive to participate caused by players’ antagonism to an
increasing number of rivals. Furthermore, we optimize conventional,
fixed-prize Tullock contests to construct the most superior benchmark
to compare against our mechanism. Through extensive evaluations,
we show that our mechanism significantly outperforms the optimal
benchmark, by over three folds on the crowdsourcer’s utility cum
profit and up to nine folds on the players’ social welfare.
I. INTRODUCTION
Crowdsourcing represents a new problem-solving model that
elicits solutions, ideas, data, etc.—referred to as contributions—
from an undefined, generally large group of people. Classic
examples include Amazon Mechanic Turk, Yahoo! Answers,
GalaxyZoo.org, TopCoder.com, etc. Recently, a new variant of
crowdsourcing called participatory sensing emerged as a new
data-collection model, which elicits sensor data contributed from
user-owned mobile devices such as smartphones. Examples in-
clude GreenGPS [1], LiveCompare [2], ContriSense:Bus [3] and
Waze.com, to name a few.
Pivotal to the viability of all such crowdsourcing systems, is
whether there is enough incentive to attract sufficient participa-
tion. A large body of prior work [4]–[11] has been dedicated to
designing incentive mechanisms for such scenarios, where each
incentive mechanism essentially determines some reward accord-
ing to users’ contributions. The commonly adopted approach turns
out to be auctions, where each bidder tenders a bid (e.g., planned
sensing duration [4] or desired payment [5]) to the crowdsourcer,
who will then choose the highest or lowest bidder(s) as the
winner(s) to give out some reward. A widely used form among
these auctions is all-pay auctions [6]–[10], which nicely captures
the scenario where each bid represents some irreversible effort.
In other words, effort has to be sunk at the time of bidding, for
example working out a solution to a problem, or sensing and
sending data through a smartphone.
A distinctive characteristic of auctions in general, is that they
are perfectly discriminating [12]: the best (highest or lowest)
bidder wins with probability one while the others lose for sure.
Thus in all-pay auctions, due to the inevitable sunk cost (every
bidder has to pay for his bid regardless of whether he wins the
auction or not), all bidders substantially shade (i.e., decrease)
their bids for fear of loss [13]. Furthermore, if a bidder believes
that there exists some other bidder who will bid higher than him,
he will choose not to bid at all. Indeed, as Franke et al. [14]
pointed out, all-pay auctions are so discriminative that, under a
complete-information setting, only two (strongest) players will
enter the auction in equilibria and only one of them will have a
positive expected payoff. Clearly, this is not desirable in many
crowdsourcing campaigns that favor a large participant pool (yet
not necessarily higher revenue) for the sake of more population
diversity (e.g., LiveCompare [2]) and/or larger geographic cover-
age (e.g., GreenGPS [1] and Waze).
Taking a radically different approach, this paper proposes to use
Tullock contests as an alternative framework to design incentive
mechanisms for crowdsourcing. Fathered by Tullock’s seminal
work [15], Tullock contests represent a distinct contest regime that
is imperfectly discriminating: every player has a strictly positive
probability to win (determined by a contest success function) as
long as he bids.1 This characteristic makes Tullock contests highly
conducive to attracting user entry, especially weak players [14],2
which is of high practical interest because weak players often
constitute the majority of potential participants in crowdsourcing.
This explains why, in reality, we see lotteries—the simplest form
of Tullock contests—much more often, and usually engaging a
larger number of participants, than all-pay auctions.
On the other hand, Tullock contests are not necessarily superior
to all-pay auctions in terms of revenue, or total user contribution.
In fact, there is no conclusive theory as to which contest regime
revenue-dominates the other in general [14], [16], [17], and an
experimental study also shows that revenue in all-pay auctions
may be independent of the number of participants at some stable
state [18]. Intuitively, the reason is that (a) the fierce competition
induced by all-pay auctions efficaciously incentivizes (a small
number of) strong players to exert high effort, while (b) the
mild competition in Tullock contests attracts a medium amount
of contributions from more (albeit weaker) players. Therefore,
1In an asymptotic limiting case, Tullock contests subsume all-pay auctions.
However, they are generally classified as two different contest regimes.
2A “strong” or “weak” player in this paper refers to a player with a strong or
weak type; type, as a term in Bayesian games and mechanism design, refers to
the private information held by a player, such as his valuation of the auctioned
item or his production cost. Therefore, a strong player means a player with high
valuation or low cost, and vice versa.
ar
X
iv
:1
70
1.
01
21
6v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  5
 Ja
n 2
01
7
all-pay auctions are advantageous in eliciting the highest-quality
contribution from the strongest players, such as selecting the best
performer for a competition, while Tullock contests are superior
in attracting more users and hence are beneficial to population
diversity and geographic coverage, such as in lifestyle [2] and
transport mobile apps [1], [3].
Thus Tullock contests are complementary to all-pay auctions.
We note that these two frameworks have been compared in terms
of their respective benefits in other domains such as fundraising
[16], lobbying [17], and general contests [19]. We find that
the comparison results therein can apply to crowdsourcing in
principle. Therefore, the rest of the paper will focus, within the
regime of Tullock contests, on optimizing this framework for
crowdsourcing.
The objective, as is most common, is to maximize the crowd-
sourcer’s revenue. To this end, we explore a new dimension in
the space of Tullock contest design, by superseding the contest
prize—which is fixed in conventional Tullock contests—with
a prize function that is dependent on the (unknown) winner’s
contribution. The rationale is to create a two-tier incentive to
improve the efficacy of Tullock contests: the first tier, as exists
in conventional contests as well, is for a player to win a prize
by competing with and outdoing other players; on top of this,
the second-tier incentive is for each player to outdo himself in
order to amplify the prize. Logically, this approach also leads to
a change of the crowdsourcer’s objective: maximizing revenue
becomes maximizing profit—revenue minus the (non-fixed) cost
(prize)—which is also his utility. To the best of our knowledge,
this paper is the first that introduces prize as a function into
optimal Tullock contest design, a subject that is being pursued
since the 1990’s [20] following Tullock’s seminal work [15] in
1980.
Ultimately, the “new perspective” in the title of this paper
has dual interpretations: (a) a new alternative mechanism-design
framework for crowdsourcing, and (b) a novel dimension of
optimal Tullock contest design.
To find an appropriate benchmark for a new mechanism de-
signed as such to compare against, we need a fixed-prize Tullock
contest. However, even this conventional and seemingly simple
case turns out to be challenging—a general analytical solution to
its equilibria does not exist and only numerical ones are available
in the literature [21]–[23]. Furthermore, we go one significant
step beyond prior art, by not only solving equilibria of such
conventional contests, but also optimizing the contests by finding
the “best” equilibrium in terms of the same (utility-maximizing)
objective. This allows us to compare our proposed mechanism
with the best possible benchmark.
Extensive performance evaluations reveal that our mechanism
outstrips the optimal benchmark by a remarkable margin: a
250% increase in the crowdsourcer’s utility (profit) and a 830%
improvement in the players’ aggregate utility (social welfare).
The improved performance achieved with these two typically
competing metrics reflects a highly desirable “win-win” situation.
A. Related Work
Even in their simplest form, Tullock contests are analytically
more challenging to tackle than most classic auctions. This is
particularly true in the incomplete-information setting3 which
is a more realistic setting for crowdsourcing. Specifically, the
equilibria of most classic auctions with complete information,
or with incomplete information and symmetric players, can be
solved in closed form; but Tullock contests with incomplete
information is generally intractable in analytical means, even in
the simplest form (lottery) [24]. This can be attributed to the
double uncertainty: in auctions with incomplete information, the
uncertainty about other players’ types is the only source of un-
certainty; but in Tullock contests, the imperfectly discriminating
nature—or more specifically the probabilistic winner selection
(unlike in auctions the highest bid guarantees winning)—creates
another source of uncertainty.
As a consequence, the literature on Tullock contests exclusively
deals with the complete-information setting or restrictive versions
of the incomplete-information setting (e.g., only two discrete
types for two players [25]). It was not until 2008 that Fey [21] first
proved the existence of a (symmetric) equilibrium for a lottery
with incomplete information. However, the model is limited to
two players and uniform distribution, and the equilibrium strategy
is only numerically characterized.
A subsequent breakthrough was made by Ryvkin [22], who
extended Fey’s model [21] by allowing for more than two players,
arbitrary continuous distributions, and a more general contest suc-
cess function. He also proved the existence of equilibria (leaving
uniqueness as future work), following the spirit of [21]. Still, the
equilibrium strategy was only numerically computed, due to the
limited analytical tractability of Tullock contests. So far, the only
known analytical solution to equilibria with a continuous type
distribution, is due to Ewerhart [26] who constructed a rather
special distribution to obtain a closed-form expression. However,
the distribution is rather complex and not generalizable, and the
model is still limited to a two-player lottery only.
In this paper, under a general crowdsourcing model with
incomplete information, we derive the optimal prize function that
maximizes the crowdsourcer’s utility cum profit. Surprisingly, our
solution of the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium (a) can be
expressed in a simple and closed form in general cases, and (b)
is agnostic to the number of players. These are in stark contrast
to prior art, and in practical terms, imply that our mechanism
(a) can be easily implemented in web agents and smartphone
apps that act in a fully distributed manner, and (b) overcomes the
disincentive to participate caused by player’s antagonism to an
increasing number of rivals.
Along the line of optimal Tullock contest design, two general
directions have been pursued in prior work. One stream of
research explores whether the prize should be allocated to a
single winner or all the players in a hierarchical manner. For
example, [20] applies a rank-dependent expected utility model
to a lottery in which the prize was divided into, according to
ranks, a few large prizes and a large number of small prizes.
However, [27] proves that it is optimal to give the entire prize to
a single winner in a symmetric equilibrium. The other direction
focuses on whether and how to bias players in such a way that
induces the maximum revenue. For instance, [14] allows the
crowdsourcer to assign different weights (preferences) to players
in a discriminative manner for revenue maximization. [19] proves
3Briefly speaking, with complete information all the players are informed of
all the others’ types, while with incomplete information each player only knows
his own type. Section II explains this in more detail.
that a biased lottery (like [14]) achieves the same revenue as a
biased all-pay auction, when both are fully optimized. In the fair
case, [19] proves that an optimal lottery is always superior to an
optimal all-pay auction.
Our proposed approach represents a new dimension in the
design space of Tullock contests. Provisioning contest prize as
a function (of the unknown winner’s contribution) sets this work
apart from all prior work on Tullock contests in which prizes are
fixed and known ex ante.
B. Contributions
The main contributions of this paper are summarized below:
1) This work is the first attempt in the crowdsourcing literature
that uses Tullock contests as a new framework to design
incentive mechanisms.
2) We explore a new dimension of optimal Tullock contest design
by provisioning the prize as a function. We demonstrate the
simplicity of our approach which makes it particularly well-
suited for rapid prototyping in fully distributed web agents and
smartphone apps. We also show that our approach overcomes
the disincentive caused by players’ antagonism to an increasing
number of rivals.
3) As a byproduct of this work, we construct an optimal fixed-
prize Tullock contest as the benchmark for comparison and out-
line a step-by-step algorithm for it. This benchmark precisely
falls in line with standard Tullock contests on which extensive
studies are based. Therefore, the benchmark, its constructing
algorithm and the associated performance analysis, are highly
instructive for future research on Tullock contests.
4) Our last contribution, which is not mentioned above, is that we
introduce a new parameter—the crowdsourcer’s valuation of
user contribution—into the contest model, and show that it has
an exponential positive effect on the performance of both our
and conventional mechanisms. In practical terms, this means
that a crowdsourcer can accrue higher payoff by improving his
business processes via a better utilization of the crowdsourced
contributions.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section II presents
our model with our proposed mechanism, and Section III analyzes
the model to derive the optimal Tullock contest. The optimal
benchmark is then constructed in Section IV. Following that, an
extensive performance evaluation is provided in Section V which
demonstrates key results and offers intuition as well. Finally,
Section VI concludes.
II. CONTEST MODEL
Sitting at the core of a Tullock contest framework is a contest
success function (CSF) which specifies the probability that a
player i = 1, 2, ..., n who exerts (or “bids”) effort bi wins the
contest. Our model assumes a very general form of CSF:
Pr(bi) =
g(bi)∑n
j=1 g(bj)
(1)
which generalizes the classic Tullock CSF, bri /
∑n
j=1 b
r
j where
r > 0, as well as the most-studied form of r = 1 (also known as
lottery). In (1), g(·) is a nonnegative, strictly increasing function
that satisfies g(0) = 0 and converts player i’s effort bi into
his contribution ξi. For mathematical convenience, we assume
that g(·) is twice differentiable and concave, which captures
the common phenomenon of diminishing marginal return when
exerting effort. When bi = 0 for all i, i.e., no one exerts effort,
we assume Pr(bi) = 0, i.e., no one will win any prize.4
Another crucial component of our contest model is a prize
function V (ξw) that we specifically introduce in the contest,
which is a (monetary) prize of a common value that is dependent
on the (unknown) winner’s contribution ξw. Accordingly, a player
i will receive an expected income of Pr(bi)V (ξi). This function
V (·) is common knowledge to all players (e.g., via announcement
by the crowdsourcer).
Each player is characterized by his type—his marginal cost of
exerting effort—denoted by ci ∈ [c, c], where 0 < c < c. That is,
exerting effort bi will incur a cost of cibi to player i. Thus, if the
effort profile of all the players is b := (b1, b2, ..., bn), the payoff
of player i can be expressed in the following quasi-linear form:
Pr(bi)V (ξi)− cibi.
Since ξi = g(bi), a player’s (ex post) payoff given the contribution
strategy profile of all the players ξ := (ξ1, ξ2, ..., ξn), is
u˜i(ci, ξ) =
ξi∑n
j=1 ξj
V (ξi)− h(ξi)ci (2)
where h := g−1 is the inverse function of g(·). We note that g−1
exists because g(·) is strictly monotone.
As crowdsourcing typically involves an undefined group of
people, we assume the interim stage which corresponds to an
incomplete-information setting: each player i is informed of his
own type ci but not of others’, yet it is common knowledge that all
the ci are independently drawn from a continuum [c, c] according
to a c.d.f. F (c) or p.d.f. f(c) = F ′(c).5 On the contrary, the ex
ante stage corresponds to a no-information setting where players
do not know anyone’s type including their own, and the ex post
stage corresponds to a complete-information setting where all the
players’ types are common knowledge.
The crowdsourcer collects revenue from the aggregate contri-
bution of all the players, and bears the cost of paying for the
(variable) prize. The profit cum utility of the crowdsourcer is
thus
p˜i = ν
n∑
i=1
ξi − V (ξw) (3)
where ν is the crowdsourcer’s valuation of per unit user contri-
bution. This parameter ν does not appear in prior work where
a unity value is always implicitly assumed. However, explicitly
modeling this parameter not only homogenizes the dimension of
the expression (3), but also allows us to investigate the impact
of ν on key metrics such as the player strategy, prize, profit,
and social welfare, which turns out (cf. Section V-D) to be an
interesting combination of both linearity and nonlinearity.
4An alternative and more commonly adopted practice in the literature, is
assuming Pr(bi) = 1/n. However, the prizes therein are all fixed, and hence
if bi = 0 for all i, a player j will have incentive to deviate by exerting an
infinitesimal effort  > 0 to increase his payoff by (1 − 1
n
)vj − O() where
vj is his valuation of the prize. Therefore, an “all-zero-bid” equilibrium does
not exist. In our case, however, the prize is a function V (·) of contribution and
V () can be so small that players lose the incentive to deviate from all-zero bids.
Therefore, we impose Pr(bi) = 0 if bi = 0, ∀i to reinstate this incentive. Indeed,
we will show later in Proposition 2 that our mechanism ensures that a player will
receive strictly positive payoff if he exerts non-zero effort.
5In practice, such a distribution F (c) can be obtained (and published) by the
crowdsourcer based on historic data, or—when historic data is not available—
assume uniform distribution as widely used in the Bayesian game literature (our
model constitutes a Bayesian game with private information being player types
and common prior being the type distribution).
III. PROPOSED OPTIMAL TULLOCK CONTEST
The solution concept of a game with incomplete information is
a pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium, in which each player
plays a strategy that maximizes his expected utility given his
belief about other players’ types and that other players also play
their respective equilibrium strategies. Formally, it is a strategy
profile ξBNE = (ξBNE1 , ξ
BNE
2 , ..., ξ
BNE
n ) that satisfies
ui(ci, ξ
BNE
i ; ξ
BNE
−i ) ≥ ui(ci, ξi; ξBNE−i ), ∀ξi,∀i,
where ui is the expected utility of player i, defined as
ui(ci, ξi) := Eξ−i [u˜i(ci, ξ)] (4)
where ξ = (ξi, ξ−i), and u˜i is defined in (2).
Definition (4) can be expanded as follows. In a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium, each player’s strategy ξi is a function of his own type
ci and the common prior, i.e., each player’s belief about all the
other players’ types. As our setting is symmetric, in that the prior
is a common distribution F (·) for all the players,6 we focus on
symmetric equilibria in which any player i’s equilibrium strategy
is specified by a function β : [c, c] → R+ as ξi = β(ci),∀i.
Therefore, definition (4) can be rewritten based on (2), as
u(c, ξ) = p(ξ)V (ξ)− h(ξ)c (5)
for an arbitrary type c and strategy ξ, where
p(ξ) :=
∫
Θn−1
ξ
ξ +
∑n−1
j=1 β(c˜j)
n−1∏
j=1
dF (c˜j) (6)
in which Θ := [c, c].
Thus, for a particular player i, his expected utility is ui =
u(ci, ξi) which can be computed from (5).
Proposition 1 (Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium). Our
Tullock contest model admits a unique, monotone decreasing,
pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Due to space constraint, we defer all the proofs of this paper
to [28].
Henceforth, we will exclusively deal with the equilibrium, and
thereby drop the superscript BNE for brevity.
Lemma 1 (Equilibrium Contribution Strategy). Given an arbi-
trary prize function V (·), the (symmetric) equilibrium strategy
β(·) of our Tullock contest, as in ξ = β(c), is implicitly given by
p(ξ)V (ξ)− h(ξ)c =
∫ c
c
h(β(c˜)) dc˜, ∀c ∈ [c, c]. (7)
We remark on the following:
• Equation (7) has an intuitive interpretation: player i’s expected
utility, as represented by the l.h.s., is determined by his cost
advantage relative to the highest-cost player, modulated by his
contribution level.
• There is no closed-form solution to (7) for an arbitrary V (·).
In fact, even the fixed-prize case (as in conventional contests)
does not have a closed-form solution in general either [24].
However, an interesting and counter-intuitive finding arises from
6In an asymmetric setting, player types follow their respective and generally
different distributions Fi(ci), which is common knowledge. Not only is solving
such asymmetric equilibria still an open problem with no analytical solution
in general [24], but this setting also makes all players onymous and thus may
engender privacy concerns in practice.
maximizing the crowdsourcer’s utility through an optimal prize
function, on which we remark following the next theorem.
Theorem 1 (Optimal Prize Function, Strategy, and Maximum
Profit). The optimal prize function that maximizes the crowd-
sourcer’s utility (profit) in our Tullock contest is given by
V ∗(ξw) =
[
β−1(ξw)h(ξw)−
∫ ξw
ξ
h(ξ˜) dβ−1(ξ˜)
]/
p(ξw) (8)
where ξ = β(c) and β−1(·) is the inverse function of the
equilibrium strategy β(·) which, as in ξ = β(c), is given by
h′(ξ) =
ν
c+ F (c)f(c)
, ∀c ∈ [c, c]. (9)
The induced maximum profit of the crowdsourcer is
pi∗ = n
∫ c
c
[
νβ(c)− h(β(c))c
+
F (c)
f(c)
[h(β(c))− h(β(c))]
]
dF (c). (10)
We will illustrate how to put Theorem 1 to use, in Section V
with a case study. Here we remark on the following:
• The strategy ξ or β(c), as of the highest-cost or weakest player,
is always 0 in all-pay auctions under standard assumptions.
However, in Tullock contests, this is not necessarily the case
(unless c = ∞), which will be evidenced in Section V. The
reason is that any Tullock contestant has a positive winning
probability as long as he exerts nonzero effort, whereas all-pay
auctions perfectly discriminate the weakest bidders who have
no chance to win.
• Analytical tractability and Practical implication: An in-
teresting and somewhat surprising observation is that, while
“functionizing” the contest prize would, intuitively, seem to
introduce complexity to conventional, fixed-prize contests, the
equilibrium strategy (9) turns out to be much simpler compared
to the fixed-prize case (cf. (12) in Section IV). In fact, for
most and common functions h(·), it (9) can be expressed
in closed form. This convenient analytical tractability is in
stark contrast to prior art (see [21]–[23] and a survey [24])
where equilibria do not have analytical solutions in general
and can only resort to numerical methods. Theoretically, this
lends us a lot of convenience in subsequent technical treatments
and other possible future extensions. Practically, this fosters
the application of our mechanism via easily-implementable
software deployed in web agents and smartphone apps that act
on each user’s behalf to determine his contribution strategy in
a fully distributed manner.7
• Agnosticism of strategy and Practical implication: Another
surprising observation is that the equilibrium strategy (9) is
agnostic to n. This is counter-intuitive and in direct contrast
with prior findings (again see [21]–[24]; also cf. (12)) where
players are antagonistic to an increasing number of rivals: when
the number of players increases, each individual player’s chance
of winning will be diluted, and hence if the prize is fixed,
7Note that the optimal prize function (8) and maximum profit (10) are computed
on the other hand by a centralized, and computationally powerful server, and
the computation takes the already-solved β(·) (9) as input, unlike in (12) β0(·)
is unknown. In fact, in many cases such as demonstrated in Section V, the
computation in our mechanism is fairly straightforward.
each player will have to expect a lower utility, resulting in a
disincentive to participate. However, now that players can stay
agnostic to the participant pool size,8 they need not worry about
an increasing number of rivals, which certainly strengthens the
motivation to participate or stay in the campaign. In more prac-
tical terms, participants would even not be averse to spreading
the awareness and publicity of a campaign, which helps further
expand the participant pool.
Now we state an important condition pertaining to general
incentive mechanisms: individual rationality (IR) [29]. It means
that any participating player should receive in equilibrium a
nonnegative expected utility, or in other words, each player should
be better off or at least remain neutral by participating. In the
following, we prove that our mechanism possesses a stronger
version of IR.
Proposition 2 (Strict Individual Rationality). Our Tullock con-
test with the prize function given by Theorem 1 satisfies strict
individual rationality (SIR), where all the players receive strictly
positive expected utility, except that a player of type c—which
happens with probability zero—expects a surplus of zero (and
hence is indifferent in participating).
Another often-discussed property in mechanism design is in-
centive compatibility (IC) [29] or truthfulness, which means that
all players report their types truthfully. This property is tech-
nically irrelevant to our mechanism because, unlike some other
mechanisms such as [4], [5] which determine workers’ wages
based on worker-reported types (costs or desired payments), our
mechanism determines players’ reward based on observable user
contributions rather than unobservable (and private) player types
(costs). On the other hand, those other mechanisms can satisfy IR
trivially by paying a wage no less than a worker’s reported cost or
payment, provided that IC is satisfied; but in our case, satisfying
IR requires a carefully designed prize function (8) (which is
demonstrated by the proof of Proposition 2).
IV. OPTIMAL FIXED-PRIZE TULLOCK CONTESTS
This section constructs a conventional, i.e., fixed-prize, Tullock
contest for the sake of comparison with our mechanism (later in
Section V).9 However, we augment the prior art of dealing with
conventional contests [21]–[23], from solving the equilibrium to
optimizing (as well as solving) the equilibrium, in order to create
the most superior benchmark to challenge our mechanism.
Specifically, we set to find an optimal fixed prize V ∗0 that
maximizes the crowdsourcer’s utility pi0 through a particular
equilibrium ξ∗0, and such a solution needs to be found for every
possible value of ν, the valuation of contribution. Formally, the
problem is formulated as maxV0≥0 pi0 where
pi0 = νEc
[
n∑
i=1
ξ0i
]
− V0 = nν
∫ c
c
β0(c) dF (c)− V0. (11)
The equilibrium strategy ξ0 = β0(c) is given by Proposition 3.
8The agnosticism is achieved by the prize function (8) which absorbs n and
thereby isolates the player strategy from this number.
9It is sound and fair to compare our mechanism with a conventional, fixed-
prize counterpart, as our prize function is an extension of the conventional (single)
fixed prize. This is also in accordance with [27] which proves that it is optimal
to allocate a single (fixed) prize as compared to multiple (fixed) prizes.
Proposition 3. In a Tullock contest with fixed prize V0, the
equilibrium strategy ξ0 = β0(c) is implicitly determined by∫
Θn−1
∑n−1
j=1 β0(c˜j)
[β0(c) +
∑n−1
j=1 β0(c˜j)]
2
n−1∏
j=1
dF (c˜j) = h
′(ξ0)
c
V0
. (12)
Unfortunately, (12) does not have an analytical solution. The
special case of V0 = 1 was numerically tackled by [21]–[23].
In our case, V0 is not given and we need to find the optimal V0
that maximizes pi0 (11). In the meantime, pi0 contains β0(c) (12)
which is analytically intractable. Moreover, the optimal solution
V ∗0 must not be a value but a function of ν. This problem is
technically challenging.
Our solution was inspired by solving the Fredholm equations
using a numerical method described in [30] (Chap. 5). Consider a
two-player case for simplicity. The first key idea in our solution
is to transform the integral in (12) into a quadrature sum, by
supposing that V0 is given:
m∑
j=1
β0(tj)f(tj)∆j
[β0(c) + β0(tj)]2
+Rm(c) = h
′
β0(β0(c))
c
V0
, (13)
where tj , j = 1, 2, ...,m, are the quadrature points distributed
in Θ, ∆j is determined by the chosen quadrature scheme (e.g.,
Gaussian), and Rm(c) is the residual error due to transforming the
original integral into the quadrature sum. In our case, a uniform
quadrature scheme suffices and thereby ∆j = ∆m := (c− c)/m.
In addition, since the integrand is atomless (β0(tj) = 0 for all
j is not an equilibrium because a player will have incentive to
deviate by an infinitesimal amount to gain positive utility), the
integral can be closely approximated by the quadrature sum for a
sufficiently large m, in which case Rm(c) can be safely ignored.
The second key idea is to note that, since (13) holds for all c ∈
[c, c], it must also hold for all the ci that equal to the quadrature
points tj , j = 1, 2, ...,m. Thus, (13) is further transformed into a
system of m nonlinear equations:
∆m
m∑
j=1
β0(cj)f(cj)
[β0(ci) + β0(cj)]2
− h′β0(β0(ci))
ci
V0
= 0, i = 1, ...,m.
(14)
This system can be solved using the Matlab function fsolve.
Similarly but on a much simpler scale, the profit (11) can be
approximated by
pˆi0(ν, V0, β0(c)) = nν∆m
m∑
j=1
β0(cj)f(cj)− V0 (15)
where β0(ci)|mi=1 are the solutions to the system (14).
The entire solution is outlined in a self-explanatory fashion by
the psuedo-code in Algorithm 1. In the actual implementation,
we also added a testing condition to ensure the range [V0, V0] to
be large enough to include the peak point of pˆi0 (which can be
shown to be concave in V0); we also improved the efficiency by
adding a stopping condition to terminate the inner loop faster.
These are peripheral and hence omitted in Algorithm 1.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we compare for the same crowdsourcing
campaign a Tullock contest that employs our design against a
Tullock contest that adopts a fixed prize, ceteris paribus. The
former uses the optimal prize function determined by Theorem 1,
Algorithm 1: Optimizing fixed-prize Tullock contest
Input: bounds c, c, ν, ν, V0, V0; m; step sizes δ1, δ2
Output: V ∗0 : ν → R+ (a vector of optimal prizes)
pi∗0 : ν → R+ (a vector of maximum profits)
Ξ∗0 : ν → Rm+ (a matrix of which each row is an
m-element equilibrium strategy profile corresponding to a
ν ∈ ν)
1 ∆m ← (c− c)/m;
2 c← {c, c+ ∆m, c+ 2∆m, ..., c+ (m− 1)∆m};
3 V 0 ← {V0, V0 + δ2, V0 + 2δ2, ..., V0};
4 Create a |V 0| ×m strategy matrix ξA;
5 for ν ← ν to ν (step size: δ1) do
6 pˆi0 ← 0;
7 for i← 1 to |V 0| do
8 create Fm(c,∆m,V 0[i]) = 0 according to Eq. (14);
9 ξ0 := (ξ0j |j = 1, 2, ...,m)← fsolve(Fm);
10 ξA[i]← ξ0 where ξA[i] is the i-th row of ξA;
11 pˆi0[i]← pˆi0(ν,V 0[i], ξ0) calculated using Eq. (15);
12 end
13 pi∗0(ν)← maxi(pˆi0);
14 V ∗0(ν)← V 0[arg maxi(pˆi0)];
15 Ξ∗0(ν)← ξA[arg maxi(pˆi0)];
16 end
which we refer to as Tullock-OPF, and the latter uses the optimal
fixed prize determined by Algorithm 1, which we refer to as
OptBenchmark. We stress that this benchmark is not designed to
favor our proposed mechanism, but honestly follows the well-
established standard model and, in fact, is fully optimized.
The performance metrics we evaluate are:
(a) the equilibrium contribution strategy of players, which cor-
responds to revenue;
(b) the prize that the crowdsourcer provisions, which corre-
sponds to cost;
(c) the expected utility of the crowdsourcer, which corresponds
to profit;
(d) the social welfare of the campaign, which is the aggregate
utility of all the players at equilibrium and we denote by
U := Ec[
∑n
i=1 ui]; it measures the total surplus of the
community by participating in the crowdsourcing campaign.
The rationale is that a company is typically profit-driven and thus
concerned about the metrics (a)–(c), while a government agency
or a non-profit organization may focus more on the metric (d).
The primary scenario in this section consists of two players
whose marginal contribution costs are independently drawn from
a uniform distribution F (c) = c − 1, c ∈ [1, 2]. Player effort b
is converted to user contribution ξ according to ξ = g(b) =
√
b,
and hence h(ξ) := g−1(ξ) = ξ2. Such a setup is common in
the literature such as [21], [22]. This scenario is then extend to
a n-player setting.
A. Tullock-OPF: Analytical Results
Our mechanism can be solved analytically, and the solving
process also illustrates how to put Theorem 1 to use. First, the
equilibrium contribution strategy can be obtained via (9) as
ξ = β(c) =
ν
4c− 2 . (16)
Hence β−1(ξ) = ν/(4ξ) + 1/2, and the numerator of (8) equals
ξ2(
ν
4ξ
+
1
2
) +
∫ ξ
ξ
ξ˜2 · ν
4ξ˜2
dξ˜ =
ξ2
2
+
νξ
2
− ν
2
24
where ξ = β(c) = ν/6. Using (6), the denominator of (8) equals
p(ξ) =
∫ 2
1
ξ
ξ + ν4c−2
dc =
∫ 2
1
(
1− ν
ξ(4c− 2) + ν
)
dc
= 1− ν
4ξ
log(4ξc+ ν − 2ξ)
∣∣∣2
1
= 1− ν
4ξ
log
6ξ + ν
2ξ + ν
.
Therefore, the optimal prize function (8) is obtained as
V ∗(ξw) =
ξ2w
2 +
νξw
2 − ν
2
24
1− ν4ξw log
6ξw+ν
2ξw+ν
. (17)
Finally, the induced maximum profit is obtained via (10):
pi∗ = 2
∫ 2
1
[
ν2
4c− 2−
ν2c
(4c− 2)2 +(c− 1)
(ν2
36
− ν
2
(4c− 2)2
)]
dc
= 2ν2
∫ 2
1
(
1
8c− 4 +
c− 1
36
)
dc =
(
log 3
4
+
1
36
)
ν2 (18)
B. OptBenchmark: Numerical Results
OptBenchmark can only be numerically solved, using Algo-
rithm 1, of which the parameters are specified by Table I.
Table I: Parameters for Algorithm 1 (OptBenchmark)
Parameter ν ν V0 V0 m δ1 δ2
Value 0.5 5 0.01 5 100 0.5 0.01
Fig. 1 reveals the trajectory of finding the duple (V ∗0 , pi
∗
0),
i.e., the optimal prize and maximum profit, by evaluating over
a range of possible prizes, for each ν = 1, 2, 3. The optimal
duple is found at the peak of each curve, and the curves clearly
demonstrate the concavity of profit versus prize, which confirms
the existence and uniqueness of the optimum. Furthermore, how
the optimal duple (V ∗0 , pi
∗
0) is affected by ν is examined by Fig. 2.
Interestingly, prize V ∗0 coincides with profit pi
∗
0 for all the ν’s. This
indicates that the revenue of OptBenchmark is double of the cost
(prize). This also implies that, if in Fig. 1 we draw all the other
trajectories (in addition to the in-situ three), the peak points of
all the trajectories will all fall onto the same straight line y = x.
Another observation in Fig. 2 is that both prize and profit are
convexly increasing in ν. We will revisit this nonlinear behavior
together with other subsequent observations in Section V-D.
C. Comparison
Given that both Tullock-OPF and OptBenchmark are solved
by now, we proceed to compare them with respect to the four
metrics mentioned earlier.
Crowdsourcing Revenue: Fig. 3a examines the equilibrium
contribution strategy of players as a function of player type, for
each ν = 1, 2, 3. We remark on three observations. First, in all the
cases (3×2 curves), the strategy is monotone decreasing in type,
which conforms to our Proposition 1 (which subsumes V (·) being
constant). The convex trend is also consistent with the literature:
for example, we verified a special case of OptBenchmark with
h(ξ) = ξ, ν = 1, c ∈ [0.01, 1.01], which is the same as [21], and
the result (not reproduced here) exactly matched [21]. Second,
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Figure 3: Comparison of Tullock-OPF against OptBenchmark.
for any ν, Tullock-OPF elicits significantly higher contribution
than OptBenchmark for every possible type c, by about 150% for
high-cost (weak) players and 400% for low-cost (strong) players.
Third, in both mechanisms, the highest-cost or weakest player
makes strictly positive contribution, i.e., ξ = β(c) > 0, indicating
a sheer contrast between Tullock contests and auctions where
ξ = 0; here we recall the first remark below Theorem 1.
Crowdsourcing Cost: Fig. 3b compares the optimal prize
function V ∗(ξw) in Tullock-OPF against the optimal fixed prize
V ∗0 in OptBenchmark. Note that the support of V
∗(ξw) is [ξ, ξ] =
[ν/6, ν/2] which follows from (16). While it is intuitive that each
of the three V ∗(ξw) curves increases in winner’s contribution,
it is interesting to note that each curve fits a straight line very
well, which suggests that the computation of (17) could be
remarkably simplified in practice via linear approximation. While
this advantage should not be overstated as to how it generalizes, it
hints at a possible line of future work. Moreover and noteworthily,
the diagram shows that the prize offered by Tullock-OPF is
generally well above OptBenchmark. This raises an important
question that whether this much higher cost to be borne by the
crowdsourcer will eventually pay off, which is answered next.
Crowdsourcing Profit: Fig. 3c evaluates the maximum profit
that a crowdsourcer garners from the two mechanisms. The salient
observation is that Tullock-OPF outperforms OptBenchmark by a
large profit margin, which strongly corroborates our proposal of
using an optimized prize function to supersede the conventional,
fixed prize in Tullock contests. For a closer examination, we
collate the results into Table II and calculate the ratio between
each pair of profits for all the ν’s. It is interesting to note that
the ratio almost remains constant, at about 3.53. This could be
explained by the nature of optimization which has pushed the
profit to the limit in both mechanisms. In addition, a rigorous
analysis as well as investigating to what extent this result can
generalize may be worth future exploring.
Social Welfare: In Tullock-OPF, this can be analytically ob-
tained. To solve for U = Ec[
∑n
i=1 ui], rather than using the
definition (5), we leverage on Lemma 1 which lends us much
more convenience:
U = Ec
[
n∑
i=1
ui
]
= n
∫ c
c
∫ c
c
h(β(c˜)) dc˜dF (c) (19)
= n
∫ c
c
∫ c
c
ν2
(4c˜− 2)2 dc˜dF (c)
= 2
∫ 2
1
ν2
8
(
1
2c− 1 −
1
3
)
dc =
(
log 3
8
− 1
12
)
ν2
One the other hand, the social welfare in OptBenchmark has to
resort to numerical methods. To do so, we take the output Ξ∗0 of
Algorithm 1, and denote the row Ξ∗0(ν) corresponding to each ν
Table II: Profit Comparison and Ratios
ν 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
OptBenchmark 0.0213 0.0853 0.1927 0.3426 0.5354 0.7710 1.0494 1.3707 1.7347 2.1417
Tullock-OPF 0.0756 0.3024 0.6805 1.2097 1.8902 2.7219 3.7048 4.8389 6.1242 7.5608
Ratio 3.5533 3.5450 3.5315 3.5307 3.5306 3.5303 3.5303 3.5303 3.5303 3.5303
by a strategy profile ξ∗0. Thus, we can compute the social welfare
as
U0 = n∆m
m∑
i=1
f(ci)
∆m m∑
j=i
ξ∗0j
2
 , (20)
which can be understood by rewriting (19) as
U = n
∫ c
c
f(c)
∫ c
c
ξ2 dc˜dc
and noting that Lemma 1 applies, without change, to fixed-prize
cases where V (·) is a constant.
The results are presented in Fig. 4. The observation is exciting:
Tullock-OPF outstrips OptBechmark in an even more striking
manner as compared to profit in Fig. 3c. The detailed data are
collated in Table III, which indicates a remarkable improvement
of 7–9.3 folds. On the other hand, the nearly constant ratio in
Table II is not duplicated here.
It may be puzzling as to why the crowdsourcer can reap higher
profit while, at the same time, users altogether also gain higher
surplus. This constitutes a “win-win” situation which is highly
desirable but typically hard to attain. To explain this, we note
the following rationales. First, generally speaking, crowdsourcing
is not a zero-sum game like the stock market; rather, it involves
a wealth creation process in which users exert effort to create
“something” valuable that we have abstracted as “contribution”.
Second, there exists a value asymmetry between players and
the crowdsourcer, where the crowdsourcer typically values con-
tribution higher than players do. This value asymmetry is a
common phenomenon in reality: for example in the worldwide
emerging Smart City and Smart Nation initiatives nowadays,
citizen-generated data such as ambient noise and GPS traces
collected by smartphones do not usually bear much value to the
phone owners but can be very valuable to a crowdsourcer such as
a noise control bureau or a transport company (like Waze). Thus,
it makes perfect business sense for a crowdsourcer to provision
certain attractive reward to incentivize more user contribution
which in turn bears even more value to the crowdsourcer.
D. Impact of Crowdsourcer’s Valuation
Recall that we have introduced a new parameter, ν, to our
model in Section II (cf. (3)). Herein, we investigate how it affects
the various performance indicators.
This effect is explicitly examined with respect to the optimal
fixed prize (Fig. 2), maximum profit (Fig. 3c), and social wel-
fare (Fig. 4), where it is clearly shown that the impact of ν
on these three metrics is nonlinear (convex). Furthermore, this
effect is also implicitly examined with respect to the equilibrium
contribution strategy (Fig. 3a) and optimal prize function (Fig. 3b)
(in both diagrams one needs to compare across different curves
corresponding to different ν’s), and we see that the impact of ν
on these two metrics is approximately linear.
The main message conveyed here is that, if a crowdsourcer
increases his valuation of user contribution, e.g. by improving his
business processes to better exploit user contribution, his profit
and the players’ social welfare will both increase faster. This is
an interesting finding uncovered due to our introduction of ν.
Moreover, this observation applies to both Tullock-OPF and the
conventional case.
Now we dive in deeper to explain the correlation between the
above nonlinearity and linearity. On the one hand, the case of
OptBenchmark can be nicely explained: (a) the nonlinear profit
(Fig. 3c) results from the linear revenue (contribution; Fig. 3a)
and nonlinear cost (prize; Fig. 2), and (b) the nonlinear social
welfare (Fig. 4) follows from the nonlinear prize (player’s gain;
Fig. 2) and the linear strategy (player’s cost; Fig. 3a).
On the other hand, the case of Tullock-OPF is not that
straightforward, since both revenue (contribution) and cost (prize)
seem to be linear across different ν’s. In fact, an overlooked fact
was that the prize functions in Fig. 3b are shifted horizontally,
and thus one should compare prizes across ν’s for the same
winner rather than for the same amount of contribution. To do
this, a simple way is to compare the maximum (or the minimum)
winner contribution ξw across different curves, as it can uniquely
identify a particular winner. This reveals that the impact of ν
on prize is actually nonlinear. Combined with the linearity on
revenue (Fig. 3a), this explains why the profit and social welfare
in Tullock-OPF are nonlinear in ν.
E. n-Player Case
In this section, we extend our investigation to n players. We
conjecture that the above comparison results will continue to hold
in the n-player case, and hence we will not repeat the same com-
parisons. In fact, as Ryvkin [22] pointed out, it is computationally
infeasible to numerically solve fixed-prize Tullock contests for
an arbitrary large number of players because of the “curse of
dimensionality”. Therefore, this section focuses on Tullock-OPF.
In particular, we are interested in how the composition of a
participant pool, i.e., the distribution of the player types, affects
the two key metrics, profit and social welfare.
We consider two participant pools: Population-1 draws player
types from the same distribution as above, i.e., F (c) = c− 1, c ∈
[1, 2], while Population-2 draws from another distribution G(c) =
c
2 − 14 , c ∈ [0.5, 2.5]. Thus, Population-2 is more diverse—or is
more uncertain in player types—than Population-1, while they
statistically share the same mean value (1.5).
Following from Theorem 1, the equilibrium strategy in
Population-2 is ξG = ν4c−1 , and thus the maximum profit is
pi∗n,G=
n
2
∫ 2.5
0.5
[
ν2
4c− 1−
ν2c
(4c− 1)2 +(c−
1
2
)
(ν2
81
− ν
2
(4c− 1)2
)]
dc
=
nν2
2
∫ 2.5
0.5
(
1
8c− 2 +
2c− 1
162
)
dc =
(
log 3
8
+
2
81
)
nν2.
For Population-1, we leverage (18) as a shortcut to obtain
pi∗n,F =
(
log 3
8
+
1
72
)
nν2. (21)
Table III: Social Welfare Comparison and Ratios
ν 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
OptBenchmark 0.0019 0.0058 0.0155 0.0271 0.0407 0.0600 0.0813 0.1065 0.1336 0.1666
Tullock-OPF 0.0135 0.0540 0.1215 0.2160 0.3375 0.4859 0.6614 0.8639 1.0934 1.3498
Ratio 6.9693 9.2924 7.8404 7.9649 8.2968 8.0934 8.1308 8.1097 8.1813 8.1038
Social welfare can be solved by referring to (19):
U∗n,G =
n
2
∫ c
c
∫ c
c
ν2
(4c˜− 1)2 dc˜dc =
(
log 3
16
− 1
36
)
nν2,
U∗n,F =
(
log 3
16
− 1
24
)
nν2.
Thus it immediately follows from the above that
pi∗n,G > pi
∗
n,F , U
∗
n,G > U
∗
n,F , ∀n ≥ 2,∀ν > 0.
This tells that Population-2 is superior to Population-1 in terms
of both profit and social welfare. An insight that may be drawn
from this set of results is that population diversity or uncertainty
is beneficial to Tullock-contest based crowdsourcing for both
crowdsourcers and participants.
VI. CONCLUSION
To recap, this work has presented a first attempt to use Tullock
contests as a new framework to design incentive mechanisms for
crowdsourcing. Furthermore, we have explored a novel dimension
in the space of optimal Tullock contest design, by superseding the
conventional, fixed prize by an optimal prize function for utility
maximization. In stark contrast to prior art, we have obtained
an analytical solution to the unique Bayesian equilibrium, and
found that the equilibrium is robust to an increasing number of
rivals. As our model employs a very general contest success
function and assumes incomplete information, the mechanism
and results would fit a wide range of practical crowdsourcing
applications. For example, WiFiScout [31] is a mobile app that
aims to profile the performance of citywide WiFi access points
by eliciting personal experience on WiFi usage from smartphone
users. Similarly, OpenSignal [32] aims to construct citywide 3G
and 4G LTE cell coverage maps through crowdsourcing too.
The superiority of our design has been demonstrated through
extensive evaluations by comparing against a fully-optimized
benchmark. Constructing this optimal benchmark significantly
extends prior art which only solves conventional, fixed-prize
Tullock contests. This benchmark would be highly relevant to
a wider research community for future performance evaluations.
Moreover, we have introduced the crowdsourcer’s valuation
of user contribution which further extends usual contest models
(besides our prize function). It is shown to impact two key
metrics—the crowdsourcer’s profit and players’ social welfare—
in a nonlinear (exponential) manner, which bears practical im-
plication on the worth of improving crowdsourcers’ business
processes. Therefore, this new parameter could be included by
future studies (e.g., on radio spectrum auctions or heterogeneous
networks) in mathematical models to capture value asymmetry
and uncover phenomena that are previously unseen.
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